It is common, especially among psychologists, to see polarization as the product of human irrationality. In contrast, I'll argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. I'll use an agent-based computer model of group deliberation to show that groups of agents using a rational coherence-based strategy for managing their limited cognitive resources tend to polarize. I'll then introduce an extension of that model that can help us understand the role of forgetting in group deliberation. How and what we forget, I'll show, has a profound effect on whether the groups we're in can achieve optimal epistemic outcomes, and in some cases, the effect outweighs even how group members share their information. Forgetting, I conclude, should be a topic of central epistemic importance and should share space with discussions of how we form beliefs, collect evidence, and update on new information.